Chief Security Officers or Chief Scapegoats? The Bloody Failure of Amotekun and Governors’ Powerless War on Kidnapping

Chief Security Officers or Chief Scapegoats? The Bloody Failure of Amotekun and Governors’ Powerless War on Kidnapping

In Nigeria’s complex federal system, state governors are routinely called the **Chief Security Officers** of their states. This title carries heavy expectations but limited constitutional authority. Nowhere is this tension more visible than in the Southwest, where governors launched **Operation Amotekun** in 2020 as a bold response to rising banditry, kidnapping, and farmer-herder conflicts — issues often linked to armed Fulani elements. Five years on, Amotekun has achieved notable successes but also suffered painful losses, highlighting why local forces alone cannot fully address sophisticated threats like Fulani herder-linked kidnapping.

This post examines the constitutional architecture of security in Nigeria, the powers (and powerlessness) of governors, the role and record of local operatives like Amotekun, and why these efforts, while valiant, remain insufficient.

### The Constitutional Framework: Responsibility Without Full Authority

Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution (as amended) places **policing and government security services** on the **Exclusive Legislative List** (Item 45, Part I of the Second Schedule). Only the National Assembly can legislate on the Nigeria Police Force. This centralizes control in Abuja.

Section 5(2) grants governors executive powers to maintain law and order in their states, while Section 14(2)(b) declares the security and welfare of the people as the primary purpose of government. Section 215(4) allows a governor (or authorized commissioner) to issue “lawful directions” to the Commissioner of Police on public safety and public order. However, a critical proviso lets the Commissioner refer such directives to the President or a federal minister if they conflict with national priorities. In practice, this often renders gubernatorial authority symbolic.

Governors thus bear political blame for insecurity while depending heavily on federal agencies they do not command. This structural mismatch fuels demands for **state police**, a reform many view as essential for true federalism.

### The Rise of Amotekun: A Governors’ Initiative

On January 9, 2020, governors of the six Southwest states (Oyo, Osun, Ondo, Ekiti, Ogun, and Lagos — though Lagos participation was initially muted) launched **Operation Amotekun** (Yoruba for “leopard” or “cheetah”). It drew from local hunters, vigilantes, Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC) members, and community networks to address a surge in kidnapping, banditry, ritual killings, and farmer-herder clashes.

The outfit was designed as a **complementary** network — focused on intelligence gathering, community patrols, rapid rural response, and handing suspects to police — not a parallel police force. Initial recruitment targeted thousands of operatives equipped mainly with Dane guns and traditional weapons, later supplemented with some modern gear in certain states.

Amotekun emerged amid frustration with slow federal responses to insecurity spilling from the North into the Southwest. Governors positioned it as a stop-gap while pushing for deeper reforms.

### Successes of Local Operatives

Amotekun has recorded tangible wins:

- **Arrests and rescues**: In Ondo State, operatives arrested hundreds of suspects for kidnapping, robbery, and drug trafficking, resolving numerous farmer-herder disputes. Osun reported over 300 suspected kidnappers apprehended in some periods. Oyo saw reductions in ritual killings and human trafficking.

- **Community trust**: Many residents prefer Amotekun for local issues due to proximity and cultural familiarity. Operatives have combed forests, intercepted suspicious movements, and supported police operations.

- **Deterrence**: In several communities, visible patrols reduced petty crime and provided early warning against bandit incursions.

These achievements demonstrate the value of localized knowledge and rapid community-based response.

### The Human Cost: Heavy Losses and Operational Setbacks

Despite successes, Amotekun has paid a steep price. In May 2026, Oyo State Governor **Seyi Makinde** revealed that **over 200 Amotekun operatives** had been killed in operations against insecurity. Many “go in but never come back,” he noted, underscoring the dangers in forest hideouts.

Specific incidents include:

- **Osun State Ambush (September 2025)**: Operatives responding to a distress call in Akinlalu (Ile-Ife axis) were ambushed. At least three operatives died, with firearms stolen before later recovery. The clash also involved civilian casualties and subsequent arrests of some Amotekun members by police.

- **Clashes in Oyo**: Multiple encounters with armed herders and bandits, including deadly confrontations in areas like Ayete, resulted in losses on both sides.

- **Broader challenges**: Operatives face inferior weapons, inadequate funding, logistics deficits, and occasional friction with federal forces. Some reports highlight extrajudicial concerns or internal welfare issues, such as delayed appointments.

These losses reveal a core mismatch: local forces, often lightly armed, confront sophisticated bandit networks estimated at around 30,000 fighters nationwide, many operating with smuggled AK-47s, motorcycles, and extensive informant networks.

### Fulani Herder-Linked Kidnapping: A National Crisis

Kidnapping for ransom has become a lucrative industry, with bandits (including armed groups with Fulani ethnic overlaps) driving much of the violence in North-West and North-Central regions, with spillovers southward. Criminal networks exploit ungoverned forest spaces, blending banditry with herder-farmer resource conflicts exacerbated by climate change, population pressure, and weak governance.

Ransoms in the billions of naira fuel the cycle. Mass abductions — including of schoolchildren — terrorize communities and disrupt education. While not all herders are criminals, and ethnic profiling risks escalation, the involvement of armed Fulani militants in many incidents is well-documented in security reports.

Governors deploying local forces here act responsibly to fill federal gaps. However, these threats exceed the capacity of vigilante-style operatives in firepower, mobility, intelligence sophistication, and sustained operations across vast terrains.

### Why Local Forces Are Not Commensurate

Several structural reasons limit effectiveness:

1. **Arms and Equipment Gap**: Bandits outgun operatives with automatic rifles versus Dane guns and machetes.

2. **Scale**: Criminal networks span states and involve cross-border arms flows. Local forces lack nationwide coordination or advanced logistics.

3. **Legal Constraints**: No full arrest/prosecution powers or authority to bear sophisticated arms without federal approval.

4. **Sustainability**: Funding relies on “security votes” and state budgets, with welfare and training challenges persisting.

5. **Coordination Issues**: Occasional rivalry or overlap with police/military hampers joint efforts.

Amotekun serves best as intelligence and auxiliary support, not a standalone solution for high-intensity threats.

### The Path Forward: State Police and Systemic Reform

The persistent gaps explain governors’ strong advocacy for **state police**. Makinde and others describe Amotekun as a temporary measure pending full devolution. Constitutional amendments moving toward state policing could professionalize local efforts while maintaining federal oversight.

Complementary needs include:

- Better federal-state collaboration and intelligence sharing.

- Socio-economic interventions addressing root causes (poverty, unemployment, climate-induced migration).

- Regulated local networks with improved training, equipment, and accountability.

- Combating arms proliferation and corruption in security sectors.

### Conclusion: Balancing Courage and Realism

Governors exercising initiative through local forces like Amotekun demonstrate commitment to their constitutional duty as Chief Security Officers. The bravery of operatives who have lost over 200 colleagues in Oyo alone deserves recognition. Yet the crisis — particularly Fulani herder-linked banditry and kidnapping — demands more than localized heroism. It requires honest restructuring of Nigeria’s security architecture.

True security will emerge not from symbolism or stop-gaps, but from empowered sub-national capabilities, accountable governance, and a holistic approach tackling both criminality and its socio-economic drivers. Until then, the mismatch between responsibility and authority will continue costing lives.

Nigeria’s leaders — federal and state — must move beyond rhetoric to deliver the federalism that matches the country’s diversity and challenges. The people of the Southwest, and indeed all Nigerians, deserve nothing less.